We present a new type system for verifying the security of cryptographic protocol implementations. The type system combines prior work on refinement types, with union, intersection, and polymorphic types, and with the novel ability to reason statically about the disjointness of types. The increased expressivity enables the analysis of important protocol classes that were previously out of scope for the type-based analyses of protocol implementations. In particular, our types can statically characterize: (i) more usages of asymmetric cryptography, such as signatures of private data and encryptions of authenticated data; (ii) authenticity and integrity properties achieved by showing knowledge of secret data; (iii) applications based on zero-knowledge proofs. The type system comes with a mechanized proof of correctness and an efficient type-checker.
Introduction
Modern applications are mostly distributed and they rely on complex cryptographic protocols to transmit data over potentially insecure networks (e.g., e-banking, e-commerce, social networks, and mobile applications). Protocol designers struggle to keep pace with the variety of possible security vulnerabilities, which have affected early authentication protocols like Needham-Schroeder [26, 37] , carefully designed de facto standards like SSL and PKCS [17, 45] , and even widely deployed products like Microsoft Passport [30] and Kerberos [19] . Even if the underlying cryptographic protocols are properly designed, security vulnerabilities may still arise due to flaws in the implementation. Manual security analyses of cryptographic protocols, and even more so protocol implementations, are extremely difficult and error-prone. Therefore, it is important to devise automated analysis techniques that can provide security guarantees for protocol implementations and, more generally, for the source code of distributed applications.
An effective approach for analyzing protocol implementations is to rely on software verification techniques, such as model checking and type theory, and to adapt them to the security problem. Type systems, in particular, proved successful in the automated analysis of both cryptographic protocol models [1, 2, 31] and protocol implementations [12, 14] . Type systems provide security proofs for an unbounded number of runs. Furthermore, the analysis is modular and has a predictable termination behavior. Finally, type systems were designed from the beginning to efficiently deal with programming language features such as data structures, recursion, state, and higher-order functions: consequently, type systems are more efficient and scale better than many state-of-the-art protocol verifiers (e.g., ProVerif [16] used as a back end by fs2pv [15] ) in the analysis of source code [14] .
Despite these promising features, the type-based analysis of the source code of modern distributed applications is still an open issue. The first problem is that many of these applications (e.g., trusted computing [18] , electronic voting [22] , and social networks [9] ) rely on complex cryptographic schemes, such as zero-knowledge proofs. Although the automated verification of protocols based on some of these schemes is possible in process calculi for abstract protocol specifications, which provide convenient mechanisms to symbolically abstract these schemes (e.g., flexible equational theories), this is not the case for standard programming languages, where one needs to encode these abstractions using the primitives provided by the language. These primitives were, however, not designed for abstractly representing cryptographic primitives, which makes providing encodings that are suitable for automatic analysis and capture all potential usages of cryptographic schemes a challenging task. The second, somewhat similar, problem is that some interesting security properties are obtained by specific cryptographic patterns that are difficult to encode in type systems for programming languages. For instance, authenticity and integrity properties can be achieved by showing the knowledge of secret data, as in the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol [37] that relies on the exchange of secret nonces to authenticate the participants or as in most authentication protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs (e.g., Direct Anonymous Attestation [18] and Civitas [22] ).
Contributions
This paper presents a new type system for the verification of the source code of protocol implementations. The underlying type theory combines refinement types [12] with union, intersection, and polymorphic types. Additionally, we introduce a novel relation for statically reasoning about the disjointness of types. This expressive type system extends the scope of existing type-based analyses of protocol implementations [12, 14] to important protocol classes that were not covered so far. In particular, our types statically characterize: (i) more usages of asymmetric cryptography, such as signatures of private data and encryptions of authenticated data; (ii) authenticity and integrity properties achieved by showing knowledge of secret data; (iii) applications based on zero-knowledge proofs.
Protocols are implemented in RCF type-checker features a user-friendly graphical interface for examining typing derivations. The tool-chain we have developed additionally contains an automatic code generator for zero-knowledge proofs, an interpreter, and a visual debugger. We have formalized the type system, and all the important parts of the soundness proof in the Coq proof assistant. The formalization and the implementation are available online [7] .
Related Work
Our type system extends the refinement type system by Bengtson et al. [12] with union, intersection, and polymorphic types. We also encode a novel type Private, which is used to characterize data that are not known to the attacker. A crucial property is that the set of values of type Private is disjoint from the set of values of type Un, which is the type of the messages known to the attacker. This property allows us to prune typing derivations following equality tests between values of type Private and values of type Un. This technique was first proposed by Abadi and Blanchet in their seminal work on secrecy types for asymmetric cryptography [1] , but later disappeared in the more advanced type systems for authorization policies. Our extension is necessary to deal with protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs and to verify integrity and authenticity properties obtained by showing knowledge of secret data (e.g., the Needham-SchroederLowe public-key protocol). In addition, our extension removes the restrictions that the type system proposed in [12] poses on the usage of standard cryptographic primitives. For instance, if a key is used to sign a secret message, then the corresponding verification key cannot be made public. These limitations were preventing the analysis of many interesting cryptographic applications, such as the Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol [18] , which involves digital signatures on secret TPM identifiers.
In recent parallel work, Bhargavan et al. [14] have developed an additional cryptographic library for a simplified version of the type system proposed in [12] . This library does not rely on sealing but on datatype constructors and inductive logical invariants that allow for reasoning about symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, hybrid encryption, and different forms of nested cryptography. The aforementioned logical invariants are, however, fairly complex and have to be proven manually. Moreover, these logical invariants are global, which means that adding new cryptographic primitives could require reproving the previous established invariants. Therefore, extending a symbolic cryptographic library in the style of [14] to new primitives requires expertise and a considerable human effort. In contrast, extending our sealing-based library does not involve any additional proof: one has just to find a well-typed encoding of the desired cryptographic primitive, which is relatively easy. 1 The main simplification Bhargavan et al. [14] propose over [12] is the removal of the kinding relation, which classifies types as public or tainted, and allows values of public types to also be given any tainted type by subsumption. While this simplification removes the last security-specific part of the type system, therefore making it more standard, this change also requires attackers to be well-typed with respect to a carefully constructed attacker interface. In contrast, by retaining the kinding relation from [12] we also retain the property that all attackers are well-typed with respect to our type system (this property is usually called opponent typability). Despite these disadvantages, Bhargavan et al. [14] manage to solve some of the problems we address in this paper, without relying on union and intersection types, but instead using the logical connectives inside the refinement types. It would be interesting future work to try to combine the advantages of both approaches in a unified framework.
Backes et al. [11] have recently established a semantic correspondence for asymmetric cryptography between a library based on sealing and one based on constructors, showing that both libraries enjoy computational soundness guarantees.
Backes et al. [8] proposed a type system for statically analyzing security protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs in the setting of the Spi calculus. Zero-knowledge proofs are modeled using constructors and destructors. In an extension of this type system [6] , union and intersection types are used to infer precise type information about the secret witnesses of zero-knowledge proofs. This is captured in a separate relation called statement verification, which is fairly complex and tailored to zero-knowledge proofs. In contrast, in our paper we encode zero-knowledge proofs symbolically using standard programming language primitives, and we type-check them using general typing rules.
Goubault-Larrecq and Parrennes developed a static analysis technique [32] based on pointer analysis and clause resolution for cryptographic protocols implemented in C. The analysis is limited to secrecy properties, it deals only with standard cryptographic primitives, and it does not offer scalability since the number of generated clauses is very high even on small protocol examples.
Chaki and Datta have proposed a technique [21] based on software model checking for the automated verification of protocols implemented in C. The analysis provides security guarantees for a bounded number of sessions and is effective in discovering attacks. It was used to check secrecy and authentication properties of the SSL handshake protocol for configurations of up to three servers and three clients. The analysis only deals with standard cryptographic primitives, and offers only limited scalability.
Bhargavan et al. proposed a technique [15] for the verification of F# protocol implementations by automatically extracting ProVerif models [16] . The technique was successfully used to verify implementations of real-world cryptographic protocols such as TLS [13] . The analysis, however, is not compositional and is significantly less scalable than type-checking [14] . Furthermore, the considered fragment of F# is restrictive: it does not include higher-order functions, and it allows only for a very limited usage of recursion and state.
The more technical discussion about the related work on union and intersection types is postponed to §8.
Outline
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. §2 gives an intuitive overview of our type system and exemplifies the most important concepts on a simple authentication protocol. §3 introduces the syntax of RCF be used to obtain an expressive characterization of asymmetric cryptography and zeroknowledge proofs, respectively. §7 describes our implementation and experiments. §8 discusses some related work on union and intersection types. §9 concludes and gives some interesting research directions. We refer to the long version for the results of our Coq formalization, a more technical presentation of our encoding for zero-knowledge proofs, and other details [7] .
Our Type System at Work
Before giving the details of the calculus and the type system, we illustrate the main concepts of our static analysis technique on the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol [37] (NSL), which could not be analyzed with previous refinement type systems for protocol implementations [12, 14] . For convenience, throughout this section we use some syntactic sugar that is supported by our type-checker and can be obtained from the core calculus presented in §3 by standard encodings [12] .
Protocol Description and Security Annotations
The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol is depicted below:
assume auth i (B, A, n B , n A )
The goal of this protocol is to allow A and B to authenticate with each other and to exchange two fresh nonces, which are meant to be private and be later used to construct a session key. B creates a fresh nonce n B and encrypts it together with his own identifier with A's public key. A decrypts the ciphertext with her private key. At this point of the of the protocol, A does not know whether the ciphertext comes from B or from the opponent as the encryption key used to create the ciphertext is public. A continues the protocol by creating a fresh nonce n A , and encrypts this nonce together with n B and her own identifier with B's public key. B decrypts the ciphertext and, although the encryption key used to create the ciphertext is public, if the nonce he received matches the one he has sent to A then B does indeed know that the ciphertext comes from A, since the nonce n B is private and only A has access to it. Finally, B encrypts the nonce n A received from A with A's public key, and sends it back to A. After decrypting the ciphertext and checking the nonce, A knows that the ciphertext comes from B as the nonce n A is private and only B has access to it. Following [12] , we decorate the code with assumptions and assertions. Intuitively, assumptions introduce new hypotheses, while assertions declare formulas that should logically follow from the previously introduced hypotheses. A program is safe if in all program runs the assertions are entailed by the assumptions. The assumptions and assertions of the NSL protocol capture the standard mutual authentication property.
Types for Cryptography
Before illustrating how we can type-check this protocol, let us introduce the typed interface of our library for public-key cryptography. Intuitively, since encryption keys are public, they can be used by honest principals to encrypt data as specified by the protocol, or by the attacker to encrypt arbitrary data. This intuitive reasoning is captured by the following typed interface:
Like many of the functions in our cryptographic library, the encrypt and decrypt functions are polymorphic. Their code is type-checked only once and given an universal type. The type variable α stands in this case for the type of the payload that is encrypted, and can be instantiated with an arbitrary type when the functions are used.
Type Un describes those values that may be known to the opponent, i.e., data that may come from or be sent to the opponent. The type PubKey α describes public keys. Since the opponent has access to the public key and to the encryption function, the type system has to take into account that the library may be used by honest principals to encrypt data of type α or by the opponent to encrypt data of type Un. The encrypt function takes as input a public key of type PubKey α a message of type α ∨ Un, and returns a ciphertext of type Un. The decrypt function takes as input a ciphertext of type Un, a private key of type PrivKey α and returns a payload of type α ∨ Un. Without union types, the type of the payload is constrained to be Un or a supertype thereof [12] , which severely limits the expressiveness of the type system and prevents the analysis of a number of protocols, including this very simple example.
Type-checking the NSL Protocol
We first introduce the type definitions 2 for the content of the three ciphertexts: 
with Msg2 x2 ⇒ let (yA, ynB , ynA) = x2 in if yA = xA then if ynB = nB then assert authr(xA, xB, ynB , ynA); assume auth i (xB, xA, ynB , ynA);
of type Private ∨ Un, and a second nonce x nA of type Private such that the predicate auth r (x A , x B , x nB , x nA ) is entailed by the assumptions in the system (A assumes auth r (A, B, n B , n A ) before creating the second ciphertext). The free occurrence of x B is bound in the type definition. Notice that x nB is given type Private ∨ Un since A does not know whether the nonce received in the first ciphertext comes from B or from the opponent. Type msg3 is a refinement type describing a nonce x nA of type Private such that the formula ∃x A , x B , x nB . auth r (x A , x B , x nB , x nA ) ∧ auth i (x B , x A , x nB , x nA ) is entailed by the assumptions in the system. Indeed, before creating the third ciphertext, B has asserted auth r (A, B, n B , n A ) and assumed auth i (B, A, n B , n A ). Since the payload of the third message only contains x nA we existentially quantify the other variables. The overall type of the payload is obtained by combining the three previous types:
The type of A's public key is defined as PubKey payload[A] and the type of B's public key is defined as PubKey payload [B] .
The code of the initiator (B in our diagram) and the code of the responder (A) abstract over the principal's identity and they are type-checked independently of each other.
Since library functions such as encrypt, decrypt, send and so on are polymorphic, they are instantiated with a concrete types in the code (e.g., the encryptions in the initiator's code are instantiated with type payload[x A ] since they take as argument x A 's public key). The initiator creates a fresh private nonce by means of the function mkPriv.
The nonce is encrypted together with B's identifier and sent on the network. The message x obtained by decrypting the second ciphertext is given type payload[x B ] ∨ Un, which reflects the fact that B does not know whether the first ciphertext comes from A or from the attacker. Since we cannot statically predict which of the two types is the right one, we have to type-check the continuation code twice, once under the assumption that x has type payload[x B ] and once assuming that x has type Un. This is realized by the expression case
, then its components are given strong types: y A is given type Un, y nB is given type Private ∨ Un, and y nA is given the refinement type {y nA : Private | auth r (x A , x B , y nB , y nA )}. This refinement type ensures that auth r (x A , x B , y nB , y nA ) will be entailed at run-time by the assumptions in the system and thus justifies the assertion assert auth r (x A , x B , y nB , y nA ). Finally, the assumption assume auth i (x B , x A , y nB , y nA ) allows us to give y nA type msg3 and thus to typecheck the final encryption. If x has type Un then y A , y nB , and y nA are also given type Un. The following equality check between the value y nB of type Un and the nonce n B of type Private makes type-checking the remaining code superfluous: since the set of values of type Un is disjoint from the set of values of type Private, it cannot be that the equality test succeeds. So type-checking the initiator's code succeeds.
Type-checking the responder's code is similar. The code contains two case expressions to deal with the union types introduced by the two decryptions. In particular, the code after the second decryption has to be type-checked under the assumption that the variable y nA has type msg3 and under the assumption that y nA has type Un.
In the former case, the assertion assert auth i (x B , x A , x nB , n A ) is justified by the previously assumed formula auth r (x A , x B , x nB , n A ), the formula in the above refinement type, and the following global assumption, stating that there cannot be two different assumptions auth r (x A , x B , x nB , x nA ) and auth r (x A , x B , x nB , x nA ) with the same nonce x nB .
This assumption is justified by the fact that the predicate auth r is assumed only in the responder's code, immediately after the creation of a fresh nonce x nB . If y nA is given type Un then type-checking the following code succeeds because the equality check between y nA and the value n A of type Private cannot succeed.
The functions init and resp take private keys as input, so they are not available to the attacker. We provide two public functions that capture the capabilities of the attacker.
We allow the attacker to create arbitrarily many new principals using the createPrincipal function. This generates a new encryption key-pair, stores it in a private database, and then returns the corresponding public key to the attacker. The second function, startNSL, allows the attacker to start an arbitrary number of sessions of the protocol, between principals of his choice. When calling startNSL, the attacker chooses whether he wants to start an initiator or a responder, the principals to be involved in the session, and the channel on which the communication occurs. One principal can be involved in many sessions simultaneously, in which it may play different roles.
The two functions above express the capabilities of the attacker for verification purposes, and would not be exposed in a production setting. However, they can also be useful for testing and debugging the code of the protocol: for instance we can execute a protocol run using the following code.
Since the code of the NSL protocol is well-typed, the soundness result of the type system ensures that in all program runs the assertions are entailed by the assumptions, i.e., the code is safe when executed by an arbitrary attacker. In addition, the two nonces are given type Private and thus they are not revealed to the opponent.
The RCF

∀ ∧∨ Calculus
The Refined Concurrent FPC (RCF) [12] is a simple programming language extending the Fixed Point Calculus with refinement types and concurrency [4] . This core calculus is expressive enough to encode a considerable fragment of an ML-like programming language [12] . In this paper, we further increase the expressivity of the calculus by adding intersection types [40] , union types [39] , and parametric polymorphism. We call the extended calculus RCF ∀ ∧∨ and describe it in this and the following section. We start by presenting the surface syntax of RCF ∀ ∧∨ , which is a subset of the syntax supported by our type-checker. In the surface syntax of RCF ∀ ∧∨ variables are named, which makes programs human-readable. The surface syntax also contains explicit typing annotations that guide type-checking. It is given semantics by translation (i.e., type erasure) into a core implicitly-typed calculus, which we have formalized in Coq [7] . The syntax comprises the four mutually-inductively-defined sets of values, types, expressions, and formulas. We mark with star (*) the constructs that are completely new with respect to RCF [12] . The set of values is composed of variables, the unit value, functions, pairs, and introduction forms for disjoint union, recursive, polymorphic, and intersection types.
The unit value () is given type unit. Functions λx : T. A taking as input values of type T and returning values of type U are given the dependent type x : T → U , where the result type U can depend on the input value x. Pairs are given dependent types of the form x : T * U , where the type U of the second component of the pair can depend on the value x of the first component. If U does not depend on x, then we use the abbreviations T → U and T * U . The sum type T + U describes values inl(M ) where M is of type T and values inr(N ) where N is of type U . The iso-recursive type µα. T is the type of all values fold µα. T M where M is of type T {µα. T /α}. We use refinement types [12] to associate logical formulas to messages. The refinement type {x : T | C} describes values M of type T for which the formula C{M/x} is entailed by the current typing environment. A value is given the intersection type T ∧ U if it has both type T and type U . A value is given a union type T ∨ U if it has type T or if it has type U , but we do not necessarily know what its precise type is. The top type is supertype of all the other types, and contains all well-typed values. The universal type ∀α. T describes polymorphic values Λα. A such that A{U/α} is of type T {U/α} for all types U .
equality check with type cast* (scope of x is A)
receive on channel a assume C add formula C to global log assert C formula C must hold
The syntax of expressions is mostly standard [12, 39] . A type instantiation M T specializes a polymorphic value M with the concrete type T . The elimination form for union types case x = M : T ∨ U in A substitutes the value M in A. The conditional if M = N as x then A else B checks if M is syntactically equal to N , if this is the case it substitutes x with the common value. Syntactic equality is defined up to alpharenaming of binders and the erasure of typing annotations and constructs such as for. During type-checking the variable x is given the intersection of the types of M and N . When the variable x is not necessary we omit the as clause, as we did in §2. The restriction (νa T )A generates a globally fresh channel a that can only be used in A to convey values of type T . The expression A B evaluates A and B in parallel, and returns the result of B (the result of A is discarded). The expression a!M outputs M on channel a and returns the unit value (). Expression a? blocks until some message M is available on channel a, removes M from the channel, and then returns M . Expression assume C adds the logical formula C to a global log. The assertion assert C returns () when triggered. If at this point C is entailed by the multiset S of formulas in the global log, written as S |= C, we say the assertion succeeds; otherwise, we say the assertion fails.
Intuitively, an expression A is safe if, once it is translated into Formal-RCF ∀ ∧∨ , all assertions succeed in all evaluations. When reasoning about implementations of cryptographic protocols, we are interested in the safety of programs executed in parallel with an arbitrary attacker. This property is called robust safety and is statically enforced by our type system from §4.
We consider a variant of first-order logic with equality as the authorization logic. We assume that RCF ∀ ∧∨ values are the terms of this logic, and equality M = N is interpreted as syntactic equality between values.
Type System
This section presents our type system for enforcing authorization policies on RCF ∀ ∧∨ code. This extends the type system proposed by Bengtson et al. [12] with union, intersection, and polymorphic types. Additionally, we encode a new type Private, which is used to characterize data that are not known to the attacker, and introduce a novel relation for statically reasoning about the disjointness of types. In the following we explain the typing judgements and present the most important typing rules.
Typing Environment and Entailment
A crucial judgment in the type system is E C, which states that the formula C is derivable from the formulas in E. Intuitively, our type system ensures that whenever E C we have that C is logically entailed by the global formula log at execution time. This judgment is used for instance when type-checking assert C using (Exp Assert): type-checking succeeds only if C is entailed in the current typing environment.
Subtyping and Kinding
Intuitively, all data sent to and received from an untrusted channel have type Un, since such channels are considered under the complete control of the adversary. However, a system in which only data of type Un can be communicated over the untrusted network would be too restrictive, e.g., a value of type {x : Un | Ok (x)} could not be sent over the network. We therefore consider a subtyping relation on types, which allows a term of a subtype to be used in all contexts that require a term of a supertype. This preorder is most often used to compare types with type Un. In particular, we allow values having type T that is a subtype of Un, denoted T <: Un, to be sent over the untrusted network, and we say that the type T has kind public in this case. Similarly, we allow values of type Un that are received from the untrusted network to be used as values of type U , provided that Un <: U , and in this case we say that type U has kind tainted. We outline some important rules for kinding and subtyping (let k range over pub and tnt).
Kinding and subtyping for refinement types (Kind Refine Pub) E {x : T | C} E T :: pub
The refinement type {x : T | C} is a subtype of T . This allows us to discard logical formulas when they are not needed. For instance, a value of type {x : Un | Ok (x)} can be sent on a channel of type Un. Conversely, the type T is a subtype of {x : T | C} only if ∀x.C is entailed in the current typing environment, so by subtyping we can only add universally valid formulas. The intersection type T 1 ∧ T 2 can intuitively be seen as a 3 greatest lower bound of the types T 1 and T 2 . Rules (Sub And LB 1) and (Sub And LB 2) ensure that T 1 ∧ T 2 is a lower bound: by using reflexivity in the premise we obtain that T 1 ∧ T 2 <: T 1 and T 1 ∧ T 2 <: T 2 . Rule (Sub And Greatest) ensures that T 1 ∧ T 2 is greater than any other lower bound: if T is another lower bound of T 1 and T 2 then T is a subtype of T 1 ∧ T 2 . As far as kinding is concerned, the type T 1 ∧ T 2 is public if T 1 is public or T 2 is public, and it is tainted if both T 1 and T 2 are tainted.
Kinding for pair and function types
The union type T 1 ∨ T 2 intuitively corresponds to a least upper bound of T 1 and T 2 . The rules for union types are exactly the dual of the ones for intersection types.
Our type system has no distributivity rules between union and intersection types and the primitive type constructors. Some distributivity rules are derivable from the primitive rules above: for instance we can prove that T → (U 1 ∧ U 2 ) is a subtype of (T → U 1 ) ∧ (T → U 2 ), but not the other way around. In fact adding a subtyping rule in the other direction would be unsound [24] , since in our system functions can have sideeffects and such distributivity rules would allow circumventing the value restriction on the introduction of intersection types (see §4. 4 
and §8).
Kinding and subtyping rules for universal types (Kind Univ*) E, α T :: k E ∀α. T :: k (Sub Univ*) E, α T <: U E ∀α. T <: ∀α. U Finally, the rule for subtyping polymorphic types (Sub Univ*) is simple: the type ∀α. T is subtype of ∀α. U if T is a subtype of U . Similarly, ∀α. T has kind k if T has kind k in an environment extended with a binding for α. Note that α can be substituted by any type, so we cannot assume anything about α when checking that T :: k and T <: U respectively. The rule (Sub Pos Rec*) for subtyping recursive types is new, and differs significantly from Cardelli's Amber rule [5, 20] , which is used by the original RCF:
Cardelli's Amber rule (used by the original RCF)
The soundness of the Amber rule (Sub Rec) is hard to prove syntactically [12] in particular proving the transitivity of subtyping in the presence of the Amber rule requires a complicated inductive argument, which only works for "executable" environments (see [12] ), as well as spurious restrictions on the usage of type variables in the rules (Sub Refl*), (Kind And Pub 1), (Kind And Pub 2), (Kind Or Tnt 1), (Kind Or Tnt 2), (Sub And LB 1), (Sub And LB 2), (Sub Or UB 1), (Sub Or UB 2). We use the simpler (Sub Pos Rec*) rule, which is much easier to prove sound and requires no restrictions on the other rules. It resembles (Sub Univ*), our rule for subtyping universal types, with the additional restriction that the recursive variable is not allowed to appear in a contravariant position (such as α → T ). While this positivity restriction is crucial for the soundness of the (Sub Pos Rec*) rule, this does not pose any problem in practice, where most of the time only positive recursive types [38, 44] are used. Moreover, this positivity restriction only affects subyping, so programs involving negative occurrences of recursion variables that do not involve subtyping can still be properly type-checked (e.g., we can still type-check the encodings of fixpoint combinators on expressions [12] 
Encoding Types Un and Private in RCF
In RCF [12] the type Un is in fact not primitive. By the (Sub Pub Tnt) rule that relates kinding and subtyping, any type that is both public and tainted is equivalent to Un. Since type unit is both public and tainted, Un is actually encoded as unit.
The (Sub Pub Tnt) rule and kinding for type unit (Sub Pub Tnt) E T :: pub E U :: tnt
The (Sub Pub Tnt) rule equates many of the types in the system. For instance in RCF all the following types are equivalent: Un, Un → Un, Un * Un, Un + Un, µα. Un, and ∀α. Un. As a consequence it is hard to come up with RCF types that do not share any values with type Un, a property we want for our Private type. Perhaps unintuitively, it is not enough that a type is not public and not tainted to make it disjoint from Un. A final observation is that, in RCF ∀ ∧∨ , in an inconsistent environment (E false) all types are equivalent and all values inhabit all types. This means that Private being disjoint from Un is relative to the formulas in the environment.
Encoding type Private
{C} {x : unit | C} x / ∈ free(C) PrivateC {f : {C} → Un | ∃x. f = λy : {C}. assert C; x} Private Private false
We therefore encode a more general type Private C , read "private unless C". The values in this type are not known to the attacker, unless the formula C is entailed by the environment. Intuitively, if the attacker would know a value of this type, then he could call it (values of type Private C have to be functions), which would exercise the assert C and invalidate the safety of the system, unless C can be derived from the formula log. Type Private C resembles a singleton type, in that it contains only values of a very specific form. We use an existential quantifier over values to ensure that there are infinitely many values of this type. The type Private is obtained as Private false .
Typing Values and Expressions
The main judgments of the type system we consider are E M : T , which states that value M has type T , and E A : T , stating that expression A returns a value of type T . These two judgements are mutually-inductively defined, and the most important typing rules are reported below. Most of them are standard, so we focus the explanation only on the rules that are new with respect to [12] .
Selected rules for typing values
Rule (Val And*) allows us to give value M an intersection type T ∧ U , if we can give M both type T and type U . As discovered by Davies and Pfenning [24] the value restriction is crucial for the soundness of this introduction rule in the presence of sideeffects (also see §8). Also, unrelated to the value restriction, this rule is not very useful on its own: since we are in a calculus with typing annotations, it is hard to give one annotated value two different types. For instance, if we want to give the identity function type (Private→Private) ∧ (Un→Un) we need to annotate the argument with type Private (i.e., λx:Private. x) in order to give it type Private→Private, but then we cannot give this value type Un→Un. Following Pierce [39, 40] and Reynolds [41] we use the for construct to explicitly alternate type annotations. For instance, the identity function of type (Private→Private) ∧ (Un→Un) can be written as (for α in Private; Un. λx:α. x). By rule (Val For 1*) we can give this value type Private→Private if we can give value λx:Private. x the same type, which is trivial. Similarly, by (Val For 2*) we can give the for value type Un→Un, so by (Val And*) we can also give it the desired intersection type.
Selected rules for typing expressions
Union Types are introduced by subtyping (T 1 is a subtype of T 1 ∨T 2 for any T 2 ), and eliminated by a case x = M : T 1 ∨T 2 in A expression [39] using the (Exp Case*) rule. 4 Given a value M of type T 1 ∨T 2 , we do not know whether M is of type T 1 or of type T 2 , so we have to type-check A under each of these assumptions. This is useful when typechecking code interacting with the attacker. For instance, suppose that a party receives a value encrypted with a public-key that is used by honest parties to encrypt messages of type T (as in the protocol from §2). After decryption, the obtained plaintext is given type T ∨ Un since it might come from a honest party as well as from the attacker. We have thus to type-check the remaining code twice, once under the assumption that x is of type T , and once assuming that x is of type Un.
The rule (Exp If*) exploits intersection types for strengthening the type of the values tested for equality in the conditional if M = N as x then A else B. If M is of type T 1 and N is of type T 2 , then we type-check A under the assumption that x = M ∧ M = N , and x is of type T 1 ∧ T 2 . This corresponds to a type-cast that is always safe, since the conditional succeeds only if M is syntactically equal to N , in which case the common value has indeed both the type of M and the type of N . This is useful for type-checking the symbolic implementations of digital signatures (see §5.2) and zero-knowledge (see §6). Additionally, if the equality test of the conditional succeeds then the types T 1 and T 2 are not disjoint. However, certain types such as Un and Private have common values only if the environment is inconsistent (i.e., E false). Therefore, when comparing values of disjoint types it is safe to add false to the environment when type-checking A, which makes checking A always succeed. Intuitively, if T 1 and T 2 are disjoint the conditional cannot succeed, so the expression A will not be executed. This idea has been applied in [1] for verifying secrecy properties of nonce handshakes, but later disappeared in the more advanced type systems for authorization policies.
Non-disjointness of types (*)
NonDisj T U C
We take this idea a lot further: we inductively define a ternary relation, which relates two types with a logical formula. If NonDisj T 1 T 2 C holds then any environment E in which T 1 and T 2 have a common value, has to entail the condition C (i.e., E C). The base case of this relation is NonDisj Private C Un C, in particular NonDisj Private Un false. We call two types provably disjoint if NonDisj T 1 T 2 C for some formula C that logically entails false, so Private and Un are provably disjoint. Intuitively, two provably disjoint types have common values only in an inconsistent environment.
The other inductive rules lift the NonDisj relation to refinement, pair, sum, recursive, union, and intersection types. We explain two of them in terms of provable disjointness. In order to show that two (non-dependent) pair types (T 1 * T 2 ) and (U 1 * U 2 ) are provably disjoint, we apply rule (ND Pair) and we need to show that T 1 and U 1 are provably disjoint, or that T 2 and U 2 are provably disjoint (a conjunction is false if at least one of the conjuncts is false). On the other hand, in order to show that two sum types (T 1 + T 2 ) and (U 1 + U 2 ) are disjoint using (ND Sum) we need to show both that T 1 and U 1 are disjoint and that T 2 and U 2 are disjoint.
To illustrate the expressivity of this definition we consider a type for binary trees: tree α µβ. α + (α * β * β). Each node in the tree is either a leaf or has two children, and both kind of nodes store some information of type α. We can show that tree Private and tree Un are provably disjoint. By (ND Rec) we need to show that the unfolded types Private + (Private * tree Private * tree Private ) and Un + (Un * tree Un * tree Un ) are disjoint. By (ND Sum) we need to show both that Private and Un are disjoint, which is immediate by (ND Private Un), and that the pair types (Private * tree Private * tree Private ) and (Un * tree Un * tree Un ) are disjoint. For the latter, by (ND Pair) it suffices to show that the types of the first components of the pair are disjoint, which follows again by (ND Private Un).
We have proved in Coq that our type system enforces robust safety; for details we refer to the long version [7] .
Implementation of Symbolic Cryptography
In contrast to process calculi for cryptographic protocols [3, 4] , RCF ∀ ∧∨ does not have any built-in construct to model cryptography. Cryptographic primitives are instead encoded using a dynamic sealing mechanism [35] , which is based on standard RCF ∀ ∧∨ constructs. The resulting symbolic cryptographic libraries are type-checked using the regular typing rules. The main advantage is that, adding a new primitive to the library does not involve changes in the calculus or in the soundness proofs: one has just to find a well-typed encoding of the desired cryptographic primitive. In addition, Backes et al. have recently [11] shown that sealing-based libraries for asymmetric cryptography are computationally sound and semantically equivalent to the more traditional DolevYao libraries based on datatype constructors. §5.1 overviews the dynamic sealing mechanism used in [12] to encode symbolic cryptography, while §5.2 and §5.3 show how our expressive type system can be used to improve this encoding and extend the class of supported protocols.
Dynamic Sealing
The notion of dynamic sealing was initially introduced by Morris [35] as a protection mechanism for programs. Later, Sumii and Pierce [43] studied the semantics of dynamic sealing in a λ-calculus, observing a close correspondence with symmetric encryption.
In RCF [12] seals are encoded using pairs, functions, references and lists. A seal is a pair of a sealing function and an unsealing function, having type:
The sealing function takes as input a value M of type T and returns a fresh value N of type Un, after adding the pair (M, N ) to a secret list that is stored in a reference. The unsealing function takes as input a value N of type Un, scans the list in search of a pair (M, N ), and returns M . Only the sealing function and the unsealing function can access this secret list. In RCF, each key-pair is (symbolically) implemented by means of a seal. In the case of public-key cryptography, for instance, the sealing function is used for encrypting, the unsealing function is used for decrypting, and the sealed value N represents the ciphertext.
Let us take a look at the type Seal T . If T is neither public nor tainted, as it is usually the case for symmetric-key cryptography, neither the sealing function nor the unsealing function are public, meaning that the symmetric key is kept secret. If T is tainted but not public, as usually the case for public-key encryption, the sealing function is public but the unsealing function is not, meaning that the encryption key may be given to the adversary but the decryption key is kept secret. If T is public but not tainted, as typically the case for digital signatures, the sealing function is not public and the unsealing function is public, meaning that the signing key is kept secret but the verification key may be given to the adversary.
Although this unified interpretation of cryptography as sealing and unsealing functions is conceptually appealing, it actually exhibits some undesired side-effects when modeling asymmetric cryptography. If the type of a signed message is not public, then the verification key is not public either and cannot be given to the adversary. This is unrealistic, since in most cases verification keys are public even if the message to be signed is not (as in DAA, see §6.1). Moreover, if the type of a message encrypted with a public key is not tainted, then the public key is not public and cannot be given to the adversary. This may be problematic, for instance, when modeling authentication protocols based on public keys as the NSL protocol (see §2), where the type of the encrypted messages is neither public nor tainted.
Digital Signatures
In this section, we focus on digital signatures and show how union and intersection types can be used to solve the aforementioned problems. The signing key consists of the seal itself and is given type SigKey T Seal T , as in the original RCF library [12] . The verification key, instead, is encoded as a function that (i) takes the signature x and the signed message t as input; (ii) calls the unsealing function to retrieve the message y bound to x in the secret list; and (iii) returns y if y is equal to t and fails otherwise. In this encoding, the verifier has to know the signed message in order to verify the signature. This is reasonable as, for efficiency reasons, one usually signs a hash of the message as opposed to the message in plain.
Symbolic implementation of signing-verification key pair mkSigPair : ∀α. unit → SigKey α * VerKey α mkSigPair = Λα. λu : unit.
let (seal , unseal ) = mkSeal α in let vk = λx : Un. for β in ; Un. λt : β. if t = (unseal x) as z then z else failwith "verification failed"
The type VerKey T of a verification key is defined as Un → (x :
→ {y : T | x = y}) ∧ (Un → Un) . The verification key takes the signature of type Un as first argument. The second part of this type is an intersection of two types: The type x :
→ {y : T | x = y} is used to type-check honest callers: the signed message x has any type (top type) and the message y returned by the unsealing function has the stronger type T , which means that the unsealing function casts the type of the signed message from down to T . This is safe since the sealing function is not public and can only be used to sign messages of type T . The type Un → Un makes VerKey T always public. 5 Hence, in contrast to [12] , we can reason about protocols where the signing key is used to sign private messages while the verification key is public (e.g., in DAA [18] ). Finally, we present the typed interface of the functions to create and check signatures:
We type-check sign and check twice, to give them intersection types whose right-hand side is Un. While making these functions available to the adversary is not necessary (the attacker can directly use the signing and verification keys to which he has access), this is convenient for the encoding of zero-knowledge we describe in §6 (dishonest verifier cases).
Public-Key Encryption
For public-key encryption we simply use a seal of type Seal T ∨ Un , i.e., PrivKey T Seal T ∨ Un and PubKey T (T ∨ Un) → Un. This allows us to obtain the types described in §2.2. In contrast to [12] , the encryption key is always public, even if the type T of the encrypted message is not tainted. 6 
Encoding of Zero-knowledge
This section describes how we automatically generate the symbolic implementation of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, starting from a high-level specification. Intuitively, this implementation resembles an oracle that provides three operations: one for creating zero-knowledge proofs, one for verifying such proofs, and one for obtaining the public values used to create the proofs. Some of the values used to create a zeroknowledge proof are revealed by the proof to the verifier and to any eavesdropper, while the others (which we call witnesses) are kept secret. A zero-knowledge proof does not reveal any information about these witnesses, other than the validity of the statement being proved.
Illustrative Example: Simplified DAA
We are going to illustrate our technique on a simplified version 7 of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol [18] . The goal of the DAA protocol is to enable the TPM to sign arbitrary messages and to send them to an entity called the verifier in such a way that the verifier will only learn that a valid TPM signed that message, but without revealing the TPM's identity. The DAA protocol is composed of two sub-protocols: the join protocol and the DAA-signing protocol. The join protocol allows a TPM to obtain a certificate x cert from an entity called the issuer. This certificate is just a signature on the TPM's secret identifier x f . The DAA-signing protocol enables a TPM to authenticate a message y m by proving to the verifier the knowledge of a valid certificate, but without revealing the TPM's identifier or the certificate. In this section, we focus on the DAA-signing protocol and we assume that the TPM has already completed the join protocol and received the certificate from the issuer. In the DAA-signing protocol the TPM sends to the verifier a zero-knowledge proof.
TPM
Verifier assume Send(x f , y m )
The TPM proves the knowledge of a certificate x cert of its identifier x f that can be verified with the verification key y vki of the issuer. Note that although the payload message y m does not occur in the statement, the proof guarantees non-malleability so an attacker cannot change y m without redoing the proof. Before sending the zeroknowledge proof, the TPM assumes Send(x f , y m ). After verifying the zero-knowledge proof, the verifier asserts Authenticate(y m ). The authorization policy we consider for the DAA-sign protocol is
where the predicate OkTPM(x f ) is assumed by the issuer before signing x f .
High-level Specification
Our high-level specification of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs is similar in spirit to the symbolic representation of zero-knowledge proofs in a process calculus [8, 10] . For a specification the user needs to provide: (1) variables representing the witnesses and public values of the proof, (2) a Boolean formula over these variables representing the statement of the proof, (3) types for the variables, and, if desired, (4) a promise, i.e., a logical formula that is conveyed by the proof only if the prover is honest.
High-level specification of simplified DAA
Variables. The variables x f and x cert stand for witnesses. The value of y vki is matched against the signature verification key of the issuer, which is already known to the verifier of the zero-knowledge proof. The payload message y m is returned to the verifier of the proof, so it is public.
Statement. The statement conveyed by a zero-knowledge proof is in general a positive Boolean formula over equality checks. In our simplified DAA example this is just x f = check T vki y vki x cert x f .
Types. The user also needs to provide types for the variables. The DAA-sign protocol does not preserve the secrecy of the signed message, so y m has type Un. On the other hand, the TPM identifier x f is given a secret and untainted type T vki = {z f : Private | OkTPM(z f )}. This type ensures that x f is not known to the attacker and that the predicate OkTPM(x f ) holds. The verification key of the issuer is used to check signed messages of type T vki , so it is given type VerKey T vki . Finally the certificate x cert is a signature, so it has type Un. Even though it has type Un, it would break the anonymity of the user to make the certificate a public value, since the verifier could then always distinguish if two consecutive requests come from the same user or not.
Promise. The user can additionally specify a promise: an arbitrary authorization logic formula that holds in the typing environment of the prover. If the statement is strong enough to identify the prover as an honest (type-checked) protocol participant (signature proofs of knowledge such as DAA-signing have this property), then the promise can be safely transmitted to the typing environment of the verifier. In the DAA example we have the promise Send(x f , y m ), since this predicate holds in the typing environment of a honest TPM.
Automatic Code Generation
We automatically generate both a typed interface and a symbolic implementation for the oracle corresponding to a zero-knowledge specification. Generated typed interface for simplified DAA
The generated interface for DAA contains three functions that share a hidden seal of type T daa ∨ Un. The function create daa is used to create zero-knowledge proofs. It takes as argument a tuple containing values for all variables of the proof, or an argument of type Un if it is called by the adversary. In case a protocol participant calls this function, we check that the values have the specified types. Additionally, we check that the promise Send(x f , y m ) holds in the typing environment of the prover. The returned zero-knowledge proof is given type Un so that it can be sent over the public network.
The function public daa is used to read the public values of a proof, so it takes as input the sealed proof of type Un and returns y m , also at type Un.
The function verify daa is used for verifying zero-knowledge proofs. Because of the second part of the intersection type, this function can be called by the attacker, in which case it returns a value of type Un. When called by a protocol participant, however, it takes as argument a candidate zero-knowledge proof of type Un and the verification key of the issuer with type VerKey T daa . On successful verification, verify daa returns y m , the only public variable, but with a stronger type than in public daa . The function guarantees that the formula ∃x f , x cert . OkTPM(x f ) ∧ Send(x f , y m ) holds, where the witnesses are existentially quantified. The first conjunct, OkTPM(x f ), guarantees that if verification succeeds then the statement indeed holds, no matter what the origin of the proof is. This predicate is automatically extracted from the return type of the check T vki function (see §5.2). The second conjunct Send(x f , y m ) is the promise of the proof.
The generated implementation for this interface creates a fresh seal k daa for values of type T daa ∨ Un. The sealing function of k daa is directly used to implement the create daa function. The unsealing function of k daa is used to implement the public daa and verify daa functions. The implementation of public daa is very simple: since the zeroknowledge proof is just a sealed value, public daa unseals it and returns y m . The witnesses are discarded, and the validity of the statement is not checked.
The implementation of the verify daa function is more interesting. This function takes a candidate zero-knowledge proof z of type Un as input, and a value for the matched variable y vki . Since the type of verify daa contains an intersection type we use a for construct to introduce this intersection type. If the proof is verified by the attacker we can assume that the y vki has type Un and need to type the return value to Un. On the other hand, if the proof is verified by a protocol participant we can assume that y vki has the type VerKey T vki . In general, it is the strong types of the matched values that allow us to guarantee the strong types of the returned public values, as well as the promise. Generated symbolic implementation for simplified DAA verify daa = λz : Un.
for α in Un; VerKey T vki . λy vki : α.
(5) else failwith "statement not valid" else failwith "y vki does not match"
The generated verify daa function performs the following five steps: (1) it unseals z using "snd k daa " and obtains z ; (2) since z has a union type, it does case analysis on it, and assigns its value to z ; (3) it splits the tuple z into the public values (y vki and y m ) and the witnesses (x f and x cert ). (4) it tests if the matched variable y vki is equal to the argument y vki , and in case of success assigns the value to the variable y vki -since y vki has a stronger type than y vki and y vki we use this new variable to stand for y vki in the following; (5) it tests if the statement is true by applying the check T vki function, and checking the result for equality with the value of x f . In general, this last step is slightly complicated by the fact that the statement can contain conjunctions and disjunctions, so we use decision trees. However, for the DAA example the decision tree has a trivial structure with only one node.
Since the automatically generated implementation of zero-knowledge proofs relies on types and formulas provided by the user, which may both be wrong, the generated implementation is not guaranteed to fulfill its interface. We use our type-checker to check whether this is indeed the case. If type-checking the generated code against its interface succeeds, then this code can be safely used in protocol implementations. Note that because of the for and case constructs the body of verify daa is type-checked four times, corresponding to the following four scenarios: honest prover / honest verifier, honest prover / dishonest verifier, dishonest prover / honest verifier, and dishonest prover / dishonest verifier. In DAA the most interesting case is dishonest prover / honest verifier, when z and hence x f are given type Un, while the result of the signature verification is of type T vki . Since NonDisj {z f : Private | OkTPM(z f )} Un false by rules (ND Refine) and (ND Private Un), false is added to the environment in which y m is type-checked. The variable y m has type Un in this environment, but since this environment is inconsistent y m can also be given type U daa .
Implementation
We have implemented a complete tool-chain for RCF ∀ ∧∨ : it includes a type-checker for the type system described in §4, the automatic code generator for zero-knowledge described in §6, an interpreter, and a visual debugger.
The type-checker supports an extended syntax with respect to the one from §3, including: a simple module system, algebraic data types, recursive functions, type definitions, and mutable references. We use first-order logic with equality as the authorization logic and the type-checker invokes the Z3 SMT solver [25] to discharge proof obligations. The type-checker performed very well in our experiments: it type-checks all our symbolic libraries and samples totaling more than 1.5kLOC in around 12 seconds, on a normal laptop.
The type-checker produces an XML log file containing the complete type derivation in case of success, and a partial derivation that leads to the typing error in case of failure. This can be inspected using our visualizer to easily detect and fix flaws in the protocol implementation. The type-checker also performs very limited type inference: it can infer the instantiation of some polymorphic functions from the type of the arguments, however, the user has to provide all the other typing annotations -we would like to improve the amount of type inference in the future (see §9 for a discussion).
The type-checker, the code generator for zero-knowledge, and the interpreter are command-line tools implemented in F#, while the GUIs of the visual debugger and the visualizer for type derivations are specified using WPF (Windows Presentation Foundation). The type-checker consists of around 2.5kLOC, while the whole tool-chain has over 5kLOC. All the tools and samples are available at [7] .
Related Work on Unions and Intersections
The for construct for explicitly alternating type annotations was introduced by Pierce [39, 40] as a generalization of an idea Reynolds [41] used in Forsythe for giving intersection types to annotated lambda abstractions of the form λx:τ 1 ..τ n . e. In a Church-style system, however, the for construct does not have a clear operational semantics. Compagnoni [23] gives an operational semantics to function application expressions of the form ((for α in T ; U. λx:V. e 1 ) e 2 ) by pushing the application inside the for -i.e., this expression reduces in one step to (for α in T ; U. ((λx:V. e 2 ) e 2 )). It is unclear if this can be generalized to anything other than function applications. Moreover, this reduction rule does not respect the value restriction for the introduction of intersection types (our rule (Val And*) in §4). As discovered by Davies and Pfenning [24] the value restriction on intersection introduction is crucial for soundness in the presence of sideeffects. The counterexample they give is in fact very similar to the one used to illustrate the unsoundness of ML, in the absence of the value restriction, due to the interaction of polymorphism with side-effects [33] . Moreover, Davies and Pfenning [24] observed that some standard distributivity laws of subtyping are unsound in a setting with sideeffects, since they basically allow one to circumvent the value restriction. We obtain all the benefits of the for construct in RCF ∀ ∧∨ , but erase it completely when translating values into Formal-RCF ∀ ∧∨ , and use the value restriction on both levels to ensure soundness.
The case construct for eliminating union types was introduced by Pierce [39] as a way to make type-checking more efficient, by asking the programmer to annotate the position in the code where union elimination should occur. Dunfield and Pfenning [28] later pointed out that unrestricted elimination of union types is unsound in the presence of non-determinism. This observation is crucial for us, since our calculus, as opposed to the one studied by Dunfield and Pfenning, is in fact non-deterministic. They propose an evaluation context restriction that recovers soundness, but this is not enough to make type-checking efficient. In recent work, Dunfield [27] , shows that carefully transforming programs into let-normal form improves efficiency. This is encouraging, since our expressions are already in let normal form, so we can hope to replace the case construct by a normal let in the future, and still preserve efficient type-checking.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a new type system that combines refinement types with union types, intersection types, and polymorphic types. A novelty of the type system is its ability to reason statically about the disjointness of types. This extends the scope of the existing type-based analyses of protocol implementations to important classes of cryptographic protocols that were not covered so far, including protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs. Our type system comes with a mechanized proof of correctness and an efficient implementation [7] .
As future work, we plan to investigate the automated generation of concrete cryptographic implementations of zero-knowledge proofs, and thus to complement the generation of symbolic implementations considered in this paper. Also, we intend to apply our framework to analyze implementations of more complex protocols, such as the Civitas electronic voting system [22] .
The type-checker we implemented had very good efficiency in our experiments, however, the amount of typing annotations it requires is at the moment quite high. This issue is more pronounced in our symbolic cryptography library, where intersection and union types are pervasive. This is less of a problem in the code that links against these libraries, and in the case of zero-knowledge even the code in the library is automatically generated together with all the necessary annotations. In the future we would like to perform more type inference, maybe leveraging some of the recent progress on type inference for refinement types [34, 42] . The good news is that intersection and union types can be very useful when devising precise type inference algorithms [8, 36] .
